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to what types of statutes are constitutional, it seems that, except for the
rare situation authorized by this decision, custodial power should be vested
solely in. the insurer's domiciliary state. Such a ruling would provide a
practicable solution 52 in conformance with other types of abandoned prop-
erty legislation.
SELECTION OF JURORS BY VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
AND CHALLENGE
THE challenge for cause and its companion device the peremptory chal-
lenge are primarily designed to secure an impartial jury by the elimination of
unduly prejudiced jurymen. 1 While challenges for cause permit rejection
of prospective jurors on the ground of provable and legally cognizable
evidence of partiality,2 peremptories permit further rejections for a real or
imagined partiality that is less easily designated and proved.8 Essential to
52. See Cardozo, J., in Severnoe Securities Corp. v. London and L. Ins. Co., 255 N.Y.
120, 123-124, 174 N.E. 299, 300 (1931): "At the root of the selection [of legal situs] Is gen-
erally a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular
conditions ..
1. See Betts v. United States, 132 Fed. 228, 236 (1st Cir. 1904). And see Bodin, Se-
lecting A Jury, PRAcrsiNG LAW INsT. 5, Series I, no. 10 (1946) and Notes, 11 NM. L.
Buuo.. 426 (1933), 14 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 142 (1939), 11 TE=. L. REv. 373 (1933).
The word "juryman" is used throughout this discussion as synonomous with "prospec-
tive juror."
2. See 1 Tnoersox, TRIALs § 71 (2d ed., Early, 1912) ; Bodin, supra note 1, at 5.
3. 4 Bi Com. *353. Recent English cases in which the accused used peremptory
challenges to keep women off the jury provoked the following comment: "He (the ac-
cused) may well be an innocent man-and the law in every case presumes him so; if lie
feels, however unreasonably, that some of the jury will not give him a fair hearing, he may
be unable to give his evidence in as confident a manner as he otherwise 'would have done,
with the consequence that an innocent man may be unjustly convicted .... Justice will not
be seen to be done if a man is convicted by a tribunal which he believes (albeit unreason-
ably) is necessarily prejudiced against him." 76 L.J. 223 (1933).
To the extent that peremptories further the goal of reducing extremes of partiality
they also tend to minimize hung juries. See State v. Shores, 31 W.Va., 491, 499, 7 S.E. 413,
417 (1888) ; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
The right of peremptory challenge has an ancient lineage in felony prosecutions at
common law. See 1 THompson, Tarm.s § 42 n.54, n.55 (2d ed., Early, 1912), In England,
although this right has extended to some other crimes, it has never been granted in civil
cases. See THoiosox & MEIUAm, JURIES 137-42 (1st ed. 1882) ; Moore, Voir Dire Ev-
amination of Jurors I, 16 GEo. LJ. 438, 444-53 (1928) ; Note, 11 Nan. L. Buu.. 426 (1933).
In the United States, however, the national and state legislatures have granted perempto-
ries in civil as well as criminal cases. See, e.g., 36 STAT. 1166 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 424
(1946). Most courts maintain that the legislature may withhold, as well as regulate, thin
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the effective exercise of either, the voir dire examination has proved so far
the only significant means of ascertaining the facts of prejudice.4
Since both challenges for cause and peremptories are merely rejection
devices,5 their success must depend, in the last analysis, on the existence of
a panel containing a high proportion of unprejudiced prospective jurors.
Although constitutions and statutes prescribe qualifications for individual
jurymen which are designed to eliminate partiality and incompetence, the
jury list as a whole need provide only a roster of mentally sound individuals
who represent a cross section of the community; 7 and these may well be
prejudiced as to particular issues. When all or most of the jurymen im-
panelled are prejudiced, as where newspapers have influenced the whole
community to prejudge a case, only a limited number will normally be
challengeable for cause, and not even a generous allowance of peremptories 8
can secure an impartial jury.9
right See, e.g., Walter v. People, 32 N.Y. 147 (1,65); accord, Stilson v. United States,
250 U.S. 583 (1919).
Some doubt is cast upon the wisdom underlying peremptory challenges by a study,
which unfortunately is too limited to be given great weight, indicating that the effect of
peremptories is to lower the jury's standard of intelligence. See CALL=:.ww Tin Srx.s_-
TION OF Juno0s 3S-41, 89 (1924).
4. Parties seldom can afford to conduct private investigations of proslpective jurors.
It is for this reason that courts permit extensive and detailed voir dire examinatikn of thejurymen by the parties. See MoscHzisrz, TRL. BY JURY § 120 (2d ed. 1930).
5. See THoypso & M amnL~x, Jurims § 159 (1st ed. 1832) and Notes, 10 So. CaUr.
L. Rav. S9, 91 (1936), 11 TEN. L. Rav. 373 (1933). See also Betts v. United States, 132
Fed. 228 (1st Cir. 1904); Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 499, 89 N.E.
809, 811 (1909).
6. For a discussion of the qualifications for jury service see Blume, Jury Selection
Analyred, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 831 (1944). Jurors in a federal court must have the qualifica-
tions of those in the highest court of the state. 36 STAT. 1164 (1911), 23 T_.S.C. §411
(1946).
7. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-6 (1942) ; Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940). For criticism and suggestions for improving the selecticn of jury-
men, see Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Ad. inistra-
tion, 43 YALE LJ. 867, 874-9 (1934) ; Edling, Obtaining Jurors, 1 Tsx. LAw & Lroxs. 63
(1947) ; Potts, Desirabilit , of the Federal Systan of Selection of Jury, 2-3 IDAHo S.B. 53
(1926).
8. Statutory provisions specifying the number of peremptories allowed vary as to
whether the action is civil or criminal. In civil cases, from tw-o to five peremptories are
generally permitted. See, e.g., A.ta. CODE, tit. 30, § 53 (1940); Co:n;. Gmz. STAT. § 5577
(1930) ; M.Ass. Gaur. LAws, c. 234, § 29 (1932). In criminal cases the number varies from
two to more than twenty, with the defendant frequently allowed far more than the prosccu-
tion. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 59405 (1933) ; IDAHo ConE § 19-1916 (1932) ; Mo. Rrv. STAT.§ 4063 (1939) ; N-v. ComeT. LAws § 10942 (1929). The legislatures have used differing
criteria for determining the number of peremptory challenges to be permitted. See, e.g.,
MI H. Rzv. STAT. §§ 28.1035, 28.1036 (1935) (punishment involved determines number of
peremptories) ; M1o. Ray. STAT. § 4063 (1939) (cases tried in cities of more than 10,000
people receive more peremptories than cases tried elsewhere).
In cases involving joint parties where the interests of the parties are identical, and no
hostility exists between them, "party" is usually interpreted so that the specified numbr of
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With this limitation, however, and with the further limitation that the
effectiveness of the peremptories must depend in part on intuition, the
challenge technique can aid in the selection of a jury devoid of extremes
of partiality.
Unfortunately, the procedures which at present characterize the examina-
tion and challenge of jurymen permit able lawyers to employ the voir dire
examination to influence the jury panel, prevent the optimum utilization of
challenges for eliminating partial jurymen, obscure, in the eyes of appellate
courts, the fundamental issue of impartiality, and waste time and money
both at the trial and on appeal.
Under the present practice, courts allow lawyers wide latitude during the
voir dire examination in eliciting information upon which to support a
challenge for cause, and permit even" further inquiry on which to base
peremptories. 1 While the procedure in many cases permits jurymen to be
challenges is given to each "side," regardless of the number on a side. Driefus v. Levy, 140
So. 259 (La. 1932) ; see Stroh v. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490 (1877). A few courts, however,
vehemently refuse to deny any party his full number of peremptories. E.g., Mourison v.
Hansen, 128 Conn. 62, 20 A.2d 84 (1941). For general discussion see 1 TnoMarsoN &
MERRIAM, JuRrEs 152-3 (1st ed. 1882); Notes, 25 MicH. L. REv. 309 (1927), 11 TEx. L,
REv. 373 (1933).
9. Such a result is claimed in the current proceedings against the leaders of the Com-
munist Party in New York. The defense insists that it is impossible for it to secure an
impartial jury from a jury list which "excludes" Jews, Negroes, and other oppressed
minorities, while drawing most of its members from white, land-owning, Protestant groups.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1949, p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1949, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 1, col. 7.
Where a good jury list is provided, however, the converse is equally true. Titus, the
English practice seems to indicate that impartial juries may be selected without extensive
use of peremptories. A 1929 rape case in which the defendant used peremptory challenges
to keep women off the jury provoked considerable comment in British legal periodicals.
The use of peremptories was called "a rare experience," Challenge of Jirors, 68 L.J. 225
(1929) ; "of doubtful expediency," Challenging the Jury, 73 SoL. J. 619 (1929) ; and "anti-
quated," Challenging Jurors, 93 JusT. P. 621 (1929).
10. The steady tendency today is toward permitting broad inquiry by counsel to dis-
close "any prejudice or bias on the part of jurors." Murphy v. United States, 7 F.2d 85, 86
(1st Cir. 1925) ; although it is recognized that a juror may become hostile merely be.
cause he has been closely interrogated by an attorney. See Rutherford v. State, 32 Neb. 714,
717, 49 N.W. 701, 702 (1891):
Courts frequently pay lip service to a requirement that the inquiries be "reasonable
and pertinent," 'while in fact permitting extensive questioning. See Henwood v. People, 57
Colo. 544, 143 Pac. 373 (1914) (hypothetical questions involving accused's defense per-
mitted) ; Olguin v. Thygesen, 47 N.M. 377, 143 P2d 585 (1943) (in a tort action, inquiry
as to interest in insurance companies allowed). See Swift & Co. v. Platte, 68 Kan. 1, 6-7,
72 Pac. 271, 272 (1903), on rehearing, 68 Kan. 10, 74 Pac. 635 (1903) : "Considerable
latitude should be allowed counsel in the examination of jurors, so that all who have bias
or prejudice, or are otherwise disqualified, may be eliminated, but the inquiry should never
be made to introduce extraneous matter of a prejudicial character that may improperly
influence the verdict. Questions are not to be barred merely because the answers elicited
would be incompetent under the issue in the case; nor are parties to be hampered in a
thorough examination, made in good faith, to keep off the panel partial, prejudiced and un-
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questioned as a group, frequently they are individually interrogated;"
and, in either event, challenges, both peremptory and for cause, are made
orally in the presence of the prospective jurors.' 2
The timing and order of challenges is prescribed by statute in a number of
states.13 In the absence of statute, there is generally no uniform state rule as
to timing and order, the matter being left to the trial court's discretion. 14
The court may require a party to challenge peremptorily as well as for cause,
immediately following the examination of each prospective juror by both
parties,"- or, sometimes, before the other party has had a chance to exam-
ine.16 Under this rule, the court may insist that the same party challenge
first each time, both peremptorily and for cause,'7 or that the parties alter-
nate as to which challenges first. s On the other hand, the court may re-
quire that a group of jurymen unchallengeable for cause be selected before
permitting the parties to exercise their peremptories.1" And again, the
court may insist that the parties exercise their peremptories alternately, -'
or that one party exhaust all peremptories before the other party begins to
challenge.2 ' XNhere the defendant has a greater number of challenges than
the plaintiff, the court may direct the defendant to challenge until he is
reduced to numerical equality with the plaintiff, after which the parties
fit men. The inquiry may be extended to the social and business relations of the proposed
jurors with the parties to the action or with any one connected with the litigation. It
should, however, as before stated, be conducted in good faith, by pertinent inquiries, for
the purpose of sifting the panel and excluding those who are disqualified or objectionable
by challenges peremptory or for cause."
In populous communities jurors are seldom challenged for cause as the result of infor-
mation elicited from the voir dire examination. Usually counsel is looking for informa-
tion that will help him in using his peremptories. Atkinson, The Voir Dire Examnination
of Jurors in Kansas, 1 J.B.A. KAN. 125, 127 (1932).
11. 50 C.J.S. Juries § 194.
12. Some trial courts permit peremptories to be submitted to the court by lists, first by
one party, and then, following the removal of the challenged jurors, by the other.
13. Only a minority of states have enacted statutes governing the matter. Examples
are: IDAHO CODE §§ 7-202, 19-1930 (1932) ; M NT. REa. CODE § 9343 (1935).
14. See notes 17-21 infra.
15. See sources cited in note 18 infra.
16. See sources cited in note 17 ifra.
17. For discussion see Commonwealth v. Marion, 232 Pa. 413, 420-3, 81 AtI. 423, 425-6
(1911) ; Philbrook v. United States, 117 F.2d 632, 635-6 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. dcricd, 313
U.S. 577 (1941). See Bodin, Selecting a Jury, PF.UcrsIxG LAw INsT. 7, Series I, no. 10
(1946).
18. Where this is done, if the plaintiff challenges first as to juryman A, then defendant
would have the first challenge as to juryman B, etc. Instances of this practice are found in:
'Weaver v. People, 47 Colo. 617, 108 Pac. 331 (1910) ; State v. Lake, 99 Kan. 157, 163 Pac.
618 (1916). See Bodin supra note 17, at 7.
19. This practice is illustrated in Vance v. Richardson, 110 Cal. 414, 42 Pac. 909
(1895); Gilchrist v. Brande, 58 Wis. 184, 15 N.W. 817 (133); See Commonwealth v.
Marion, 232 Pa. 413, 422, 81 AtI. 423, 425 (1911).
20. See sources cited in notes 17 and 18 stpra.
21. See Mo. R-v. STAT. § 4065 (1932), and Bodin, supra note 17, at 7.
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alternate; 22 but the more common practice requires the defendant to use
several peremptories at a time so that both parties exhaust their challenges
at the same moment.2" Whatever the order of challenge, most courts in-
sist that the right to challenge a prospective juror peremptorily is waived
by non-challenge at the prescribed time,24 although a considerable mi-
nority permit such challenge until the juror is actually sworn, even where the
party has previously indicated oral acceptance.2"
As a result of extended voir dire examination of jurymen by counsel,
attorneys are given an excellent opportunity to predispose the jury in their
favor. On the other hand, where challenges for cause are made orally in the
presence of prospective jurors, there is a distinct possibility that an unsuc-
cessful challenge will prejudice a prospective juror against the objector. To
a lesser degree, even a peremptory, if exercised in their presence, may prej-
udice the remaining jurymen.
If the challenger resorts to a peremptory to remove a juror so prejudiced,
the number of peremptories available for eliminating other partial jurors is
to that extent reduced. In those jurisdictions where challenges must be
exercised as each juror is selected, the utility of the peremptory in eliminating
extreme partiality is further impaired. Here, challenges may be exhausted
against early prospective jurors who are somewhat partial, thus preventing
22. E.g., State v. Brown, 16 Del. 380, 384-5, 36 Atl. 458, 459 (1896).
23. For examples of this practice see Lyon v. State, 116 Ohio St. 26S, 155 N.E. 800
(1927) ; State v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292 (1894).
24. In St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 147-8 (1894) a rule of the district court
provided that "a juror shall be challenged, or accepted and sworn, in the case as soon as his
examination is completed, and before the examinition of another juror." The Supreme
Court denied the defendant's claim that he had a constitutional right to examine all jurors
before challenging any peremptorily, stating that the rule "is not inconsistent with any
settled principle of criminal law, nor does it interfere with selection of impartial jurics."
Similar decisions under state constitutions are People v. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 129 (1860)
State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 Pac. 372 (1895) ; see Munday v. Comnonwealtli, 81 IXy.
233 (1883). See generally Bnrmty, JUuns AND JURY TIALs 132 (1908), and Note, 21 Nr.
L. REy. 174 (1942). Where good cause is shown before the jury is sworn, however, the
courts will permit a party to use a "peremptory" after acceptance of the juror. State v.
Potter, 18 Conn. 165 (1846). Why the challenge is not deemed to be for cause is not clear.
25. O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 227 (1860) ; State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265 (1868).
This view is supported in 1 THOMPsox, TR.LS 121-2 (2d ed., Early, 1912).
In Avila v. United States, 76 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1935) a rule of the Federal District
Court provided, in part, that "the box shall be filled from time to time, in the discretion of
the court. After all peremptories have been taken, or the parties satisfied, the jury shall
then-be sworn as a body to try the cause." The Circuit Court held, in a divided opinion,
that the trial court's rule did not confer discretionary power on the trial judge to require
peremptories to be exercised at a time when the box was not filled. The court advanced the
unfounded notion that such procedure deprived the defendant of his right of peremptory
challenge, and the completely fallacious theory that he was thereby deprived of his consti-
tutional right to trial by jury. This decision has been widely criticized as enabling the de-
fendant "to compare and choose as between jurymen so as to preserve as the final twelve
those who appear to him to be most favorable." Note, 21 Nim. L. Ray. 174, 178 (1942), 10
So. CALIr. L. Rav. 89 (1936).
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the removal of later jurymen who may be more partial. Or, counsel may
accept a partial juror for fear that a later juror Vill be more partial, only to
find that no more-partial jurors are called.
Furthermore, all of these procedures, in that they tend to emphasize
tactical advantages 26 to one side or the other, tend to obscure the real
issue-whether a particular method of jury selection actually produces an
impartial jury. Most appeals are taken on procedural points, and even
though impartiality should be the only issue of importance, it is not difficult
for a court to decide the case from the viewpoint of procedure for procedure's
sake, rather than on the basis of undue prejudice or even abnormal parti-
ality.?
To insure that the challenging system best fulfills its function of aiding in
the selection of impartial juries, the voir dire examination should be con-
26. The importance which lawyers frequently attach to these tactical advantages is
illustrated by the following quotation. "And it has come to be well recognized generally
that a litigant may get the best legal service obtainable; he may have, to many right thin:-
ing minds, the preponderance of testimony and right; but if his lawyer 'can't pic: a jury'
his chances for success are very slim." Hon. T.D. Samford, Proc n.-Gs, Atx.. ST. BArt.
Ass'x 143 (1928).
27. A recent Connecticut case, De Carlo v. Frame, 134 Conn. 530, 58 A.2d 846 (1943)
is illustrative of the extremes to which an appellant court can go in emphasizing pro-
cedure.
The jurors were examined by both parties and after twelve had been accepted and
were ready to be sworn, the defendant attempted to e-,ercise a peremptory challenge, al-
though no new facts had been adduced. In granting the challenge, the trial judge sp3ke of
a "right" in the defendant, but later explained in his memorandum to the appellate court
that he had acted in his discretion. The Supreme Court of Errors reversed, holding in a
divided opinion, that acceptance of the juror constituted waiver of the right to challenge
peremptorily. The court went on to say, however, that it would have affirmed if the trial
court had acted in its discretion, rather than on the basis of a "right."
The plaintiff in the De Carlo case failed completely to show that he had en prej-
udiced by the questioned challenge, and the majority opinion glossed over the question of
prejudice without mention. The dissenting judge, however, pointed out that no prej-
udice -as shown. In fact, the appellant made no attempt to show prejudice in his brief.
He did state that, "[t]he plaintiff vwas irreparably harmed," by the permitted challenge,
hut no indication was given as to why his case vas thus damaged. Brief for Appeldlant, p.
20, De Carlo v. Frame, zu1pra.
Thus the De Carlo case appears to accomplish little other than to provide another trial
by an impartial jury for a cause which had already been decided by an impartial jury.
"... [W]hile the disallowance of a good cause of challenge will work a reverEal of the
judgment, an improper allowance of a cause of challenge will not necessarily have this
effect. A qualified juror-may be rejected, and still a jury of lawful men, against whom
there is no objection, may be obtained. .. . Obviously, the only affect of granting... [a
motion for a new trial] would be that the prisoner would have to take the verdict of an-
other impartial jury." 1 TuomansoN & MmuAti, JuRMs 293-9 (1M). Although there
are some decisions to the contrary, see, e.g., Walter v. State, 203 Ind. 231, 195 N.E. 263
(1935) ; State v. Bertrand, 167 La. 374, 119 So. 261 (1928), most cases hold that wrong-
ful exclusion of a competent juror is not cause for reversal in the absence of a showing of
prejudice. Watson v. State, 63 Ind. 543 (1878) ; People v. Prior, 294 N.Y. 405, 63 N.E.
2d 8 (1945).
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ducted by the court itself, and jurymen should be dismissed for cause on its
own motion. In order that no proper line of inquiry be neglected, however,
the parties should be permitted to request the court to question particular
jurymen on subjects believed to be pertinent in determining their qualifi-
cations. At the conclusion of the voir dire examination, peremptory chal-
lenges by the parties should be conveyed to the court in such a manner as
to conceal from the prospective jurors the particular challenges exercised by
each party. Under a suggested method, the court would select a number of
prospective jurors, unchallengeable for cause, equal to the total number of
peremptories allotted to all parties plus twelve. The parties would then
simultaneously submit to the court lists of those jurors whom they wished
to challenge peremptorily. The first twelve names remaining from the
original panel would constitute the jury.
The court-conducted voir dire, though still a minority practice, 3 is
becoming increasingly popular. On the other hand, a requirement that
peremptories be submitted simultaneously to the court is rarely, if ever,
imposed today. But it has been sanctioned in the past as within the trial
court's discretion.29 In many jurisdictions, therefore, the adoption of both
practices should be possible without altering either statute or appellate
case law.
The court-conducted voir dire examination would effectively minimize
attempts by counsel to prejudice the jury in the pre-trial stage, since the
examination of prospective jurors would be placed in the hands of a neutral
third party, the judge. And the exercise of challenges for cause by the court'
avoids the risk of prejudicing jurors by a party's unsuccessful challenge. The
simultaneous submission of lists to convey peremptory challenges to the
court would prevent prospective jurors from discovering which party
challenged particular jurymen and thus would complete the elimination of
possible prejudice resulting from oral challenges by the parties themselves.
Furthermore, peremptories would be utilized to the maximum in that par-
ties would be enabled to survey the whole jury panel and eliminate at one
stroke those most prejudiced against them.
28. For examples of this practice see Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.
1928); People v. Lahey, 256 Mich. 250, 239 N.W. 254 (1931) ; Funches v. State, 125 Miss.
140, 87 So. 487 (1921). Also see, Brown v. S.H. Kress & Co., 170 S.C. 178, 179, 170 S.E.
142 (1933).
The movement for court-conducted voir dires came from a recommendation of a con-
ference of Senior Circuit Court Judges. Moore, The Voir Dire Examinalion of Jurors, II,
17 GEo. L. J. 13, 14 (1928). Many states now permit the trial court, in its discretion, to
conduct the voir dire examination. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws, c. 234, § 28 (1933). The
federal courts have this same discretion. FED. R. Civ. P. 47.
29. In State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 287 (1856) the trial court required that both parties ex-
ercise their peremptories simultaneously. The Missouri Supreme Court held that although
simultaneous use of peremptory challenges might lead to possible duplication of jurymen
challenged, this was no abuse of discretion for the parties had exercised the full number
of peremptories to which they were entitled by statute, and had not been prejudiced in any-
way.
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